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PARTIES
The Children:
A.D., born September 19, 2000. She is the four yearold daughter of the Appellant. She and her brother are the
real parties in interest. Her best interests was represented by
the Office of the Guardian ad Litem.
Z.D., born April 6, 2002. He is the two year-old son
of the Appellant. He and his sister are the real parties in
interest. His best interests was represented by the Office of
the Guardian ad Litem.
The Parents:
S.B.D., "the Father." He is the Father of the two
Children. He was the Respondent at the trial level and an
Appellant before the Court of Appeals. He is a Respondent
before this Court.
L.D., "the Mother." She is the Mother of the two
Children. She was the Respondent at the trial level. She was
not a party before the Court of Appeals.
The Agency:
Division of Child and Family Services, "the
Division" or "DCFS." The Division was the petitioner at
trial and the appellee before the Court of Appeals. The
Division is also petitioning for a writ of certiorari.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH
In the interest of
A.D. & Z.D.
Children under eighteen
years of age.
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN
Petitioner,

CaseNo.20040837-SC

v.
S.B.D. & L.D.,
Respondents.

:
BRIEF OF GUARDIAN ad LITEM

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over the petition for writ of certiorari to review the
court of appeals's opinion, entered July 29, 2004. Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2004).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. This Court framed the sole question for review: "Whether the court of appeals
applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence." Attachment 6. This Court exercises its certiorari jurisdiction by reviewing the
decision of the court of appeals and not that of the trial court. InreB.B.. 2004 UT 39, ^1
5, 94 P.3d 252. The issue of whether the court of appeals applied the appropriate
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standard of review to assess sufficiency of evidence is one of law, which this Court
reviews for correctness. Hughes v. Caffertv. 2004 UT 22, If 18, 89 P.3d 48 (citing State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)).

2. Given that sufficiency-of-evidence reviews have a marshaling requirement, a
related question is whether the Utah Court of Appeals may review the merits of a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim where the appellant has not marshaled the evidence.
This Court has determined that, because the court of appeals functions as an appellate
body and not as a trier of fact, it may not. "The court of appeals does not review the trial
court's factual findings where the party challenging those findings fails to marshal the
evidence. Instead, the court of appeals must 'assume that the record supports the findings
of the trial court.'" Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,110, 94 P.3d 193
(quoting Moon v. Moon. 1999 UT App 12, f 24, 973 P.2d 431) (emphasis added).

STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
"Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years of
age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual
exploitation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i).
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In determining whether a minor is an abused child or
neglected child it may be presumed that the person having the
minor under his direct and exclusive care and control at the
time of the abuse is responsible for the abuse or neglect.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-305.1.

OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINION
In re Z.D. and A.D.. 2004 UT App 261,98 P.3d 40.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case: This Court granted certiorari review over a single question:
"Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of
the sufficiency of the evidence." Attachment 6. The final order on review is an opinion
where the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a juvenile court adjudication order
determining that Z.D. is an abused child and that S.D. is a neglected child as a sibling-atrisk.

Course of Proceedings: The Division filed a petition seeking juvenile court
jurisdiction over the two Children. R.29-34.
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Disposition at Trial: After a thirteen-day trial on the merits, the juvenile court
prepared a seven-page, single-spaced memorandum decision analyzing the evidence and
concluding that the younger child was abused, the older child was neglected as a sibling
at risk, and therefore both Children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
See Attachment 1. The Father appealed the adjudication order. R.847.

Disposition on Appeal: The Utah Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing
the juvenile court's adjudication order. In re Z.D., 2004 UT App 261, 98 P.3d 40.
Attachment 2. This Court granted certiorari review over one question: "Whether the
court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency
of the evidence." Attachment 6.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In his appellate brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, the Father did not marshal the
evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings. Instead, he selected those portions of
the record, including statements from his own expert witnesses, that supported his
version of the facts, which were disputed, and which were ultimately rejected by the
juvenile court. The court of appeals, did not adopt the juvenile court's findings, but, in a
surprising move, virtually adopted the fact statement from the Father's brief. What
follows is a brief summation of the supporting evidence presented during thirteen days of
20030750-CA
20040837-SC
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trial. The best overview of the facts is in the juvenile court's seven pages of findings.
Attachment 1. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, U 30, 100 P.3d 1177 (appellate court
"heavily" relies on findings of fact to resolve fact-intensive issues of law).

Up until Saturday morning, November 16, 2002, both parents stated they were able
to stand seven month-old Z.D. ("the Child") on their laps while he held onto their fingers,
allowing him to kick his feet against their laps and bear weight on both legs. State Exh.
3, 6 & 7. The Mother later remembered that she had played with the Child that morning,
holding him while he bounced both his feet against her lap. Exh. 6. Later that morning,
she and the maternal grandmother ("the Grandmother") left to spend the day shopping,
leaving both seven-month-old Z.D. and two year-old A.D. in the Father's care. Exh. 6.
The Father recalled that between 12:30 and 1 p.m., when he claimed Z.D. had awakened
from a nap, the Child could no longer bear weight on his left leg, he favored the leg, and
he cried when it was touched. Def s Exh. 3. When the Mother returned home late
Saturday afternoon, she also noticed that the Child could no longer bear weight on his left
leg and was favoring it. Id.

Approximately twenty-four hours after the Father first noticed something was
wrong, he brought the Child to Primary Children's Medical Center. The Child was
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immediately given Lortab for the pain. Tr.63. The medical staffs initial impression was
that the injury was non accidental. Tr.26.

The Child was seen by pediatrician Bruce Herman, M.D., who diagnosed the Child
with a broken left femur. The bone was broken completely through, it was slightly
displaced and a fragment had broken off. State's Exh. 6. The Parents initially claimed
the Child was suffering from a flu shot. Exh. 1. They then claimed the injury could have
been caused by their two year-old daughter who was "rough" with the Child. Tr.24-25,
Exh. 1. When the Parents were told that neither explanation fit the injury, they denied
that the Child had suffered any recent trauma severe enough to cause the injury. A
skeletal survey revealed the Child had also suffered a skull fracture, which had healed.
Again, neither Parent could offer an appropriate explanation for the skull fracture,
although they suggested the Child could have fractured his skull when he fell twelve
inches from a baby swing onto a carpeted floor. State's Exh.6.

The Division filed a petition seeking juvenile court jurisdiction over the Child and
his two year old sister. R.29-34. The matter was tried to the juvenile judge, who listened
to experts testify regarding the age of the femur fracture, the timing of the symptoms, the
nature of the skull fracture, the identity of the various care givers, the Parents' changing
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stories, and the fact that the femur fracture was nonaccidental. The trial court agreed with
the Division's and Guardian's experts that the Child's femur was broken, in a
nonaccidental1 manner, during the time he was alone with the Father. See Letter from Dr.
Herman, Dr. Frasier and Dr. Hansen, State's Exh. 6. Attachment 4.2

The Father had his own theory of the femur fracture: He claimed the Grandmother
had inadvertently broken the Child's femur three days earlier, on Wednesday, in the
presence of the Child's mother, while trying to unstick the Child's leg from a walker
("the walker theory"). The Grandmother testified that after the Child had supposedly
broken his femur, the largest bone in his body, he cried for only three to five seconds and
was quickly calmed by a few pats on the back. Tr. 222-23, 291. The Parents claimed the
pain of the broken femur was masked for three days by Tylenol, which was why the
Child showed only normal fiissiness until Saturday afternoon. At trial, the Parents

1

The word "nonaccidental" is the operative term in determining whether an injury
amounts to abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i) ('"Abused child' includes a
minor less than 18 years of age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual exploitation.").
2

Bruce Herman, M.D., when pressed by the defense to state a possible mechanism
for the fracture, opined the mechanism could "likely" have been axial loading. Again,
when pressed, he quantified the term "likely" to mean 51/49 percent. However, he, along
with Dr. Frasier and Dr. Hansen, and even defense expert Dr. Smith, agreed that the
clinical evidence supported that the Child was injured, by some mechanism, on Saturday,
when he was alone with the Father. State's Exh. 7 & Def. Exh. 15. Attachment 5.
20030750-CA
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denied their earlier statements, which were contemporaneously documented by several
witnesses, in which they said the Child could, as late as Saturday morning, bear weight
on his left leg when they had him stand on their laps. Affidavit of Bruce Herman, State's
Exh. 39, Attachment 3, Tr.771.

In further support of the walker theory, the Mother claimed that she always
diapered and dressed the Child in such a manner as to never touch his left leg. She
demonstrated this method to the judge, who found it not credible. Tr.863-64, R.879.
The Grandmother also demonstrated her attempt to unstick a doll's leg from a walker.
Tr.223.3 Again, the juvenile court found it not plausible that the Child would suffer a
complete femur fracture and be completely comforted and quieted in only three to five
seconds by a few pats on the back. Tr.222-23. R.879, Attachment 1.

The walker theory was rejected by Dr. Herman, who was permitted to sit through
and listen to the testimony of the defense experts. Tr.69, 312. The walker theory was
also rejected by Dr. William Nixon, a pediatric radiologist, and by Dr. Karen Hansen, of

3

The transcripts in no way convey the bizarre nature of this demonstration, nor do
they convey the detrimental effect the demonstration had on the Mother's credibility and
on the walker theory. The court of appeals never had the benefit of viewing this
important demonstrative evidence. See In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 2004 UT
67, If 67, 98 P.3d 1 (appellate court "particularly reticent to second-guess" findings based
on demonstrative evidence).
20030750-CA
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the Safe and Healthy Families Team of Primary Children's Medical Center. Tr.709,
1545.4

The juvenile court rejected the walker theory. The court concluded that the
Child's femur fracture occurred Saturday, while he was in the care of the Father. R.2-7,
29-34. The court concluded that the Child had earlier suffered a skull fracture, and not,
as the Parents claimed, a disappearing skull suture. The court was unable to determine
whether the skull fracture was accidental or nonaccidental because the fracture was older
than the femur fracture and difficult to date. R.879, Findings at 2, 6. Still, the juvenile
court concluded that the femur fracture was nonaccidental and that it occurred when the
Child was alone with the Father and therefore he was responsible for the injury. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-305.1 (2004) (court may presume that the person having direct and
exclusive care and control at the time of the abuse is responsible for the abuse).

The Father appealed the adjudication order. R.847. Four of the Father's five
appellate claims involved sufficiency of the evidence.5 Rather than marshal the evidence,

4

In rejecting the walker theory, Dr. Nixon testified: "This is the biggest bone in his
body at the time. If this was a common fracture that just happened with every day type
care, we'd be seeing them all the time." Tr.709.
5

The fifth claim went to the trial court's refusal to admit propensity evidence. See
Father's Appellate Brief at 44-45.
20030750-CA
20040837-SC
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he re-argued only that portion of the controverted evidence that supported his theory of
the case, citing only to those portions of the record supporting his case, and sometimes
failing to cite at all. See Father's Appellate Brief at 17-19, 22-43, 45-47.

In a surprising move, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's
adjudication order. In re Z.D.. 2004 UT App 26L 98 P.3d 40. Attachment 2. Relying
on case law from 1955, the panel gave almost no deference to the findings on the basis
that the findings were judge-made rather than jury-made. Lovett v. Continental Bank &
Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P2d. 1065, 1968 (1955) (fact that appellate body could
come to different conclusion on same set of facts is basis for reversal); cf, In re S.T., 928
P.2d 393, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fact that evidence supports more than one result
does not justify reversal of finding). In addition, the panel justified its re-weighing of the
evidence by speculating that the juvenile judge "undoubtedly" could not remember and
assimilate evidence from a thirteen-day trial. Id. at ^ 1 nl, 19, 26 ("Undoubtedly, this
elongated trial made it difficult for the trial judge to recall the evidence and to place it all
in context."). Finally, the Z.D. court tacitly approved the Father's failure-to-marshal by
including a background statement that virtually mirrored the Father's statement of facts,
including those portions that had no citation, nor support from the record, and which
were in fact refuted by the record.

20030750-CA
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The court of appeals's holding was based on burden of proof and not standard of
review: "The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Z.D.'s fracture
was caused by an axial load sometime on Saturday when he was in Father's care." Z.D.
at ^f 28 (emphasis added).

In response to separate petitions for certiorari filed by the Guardian ad Litem and
the Assistant Attorney General, this Court granted review over one issue: "Whether the
court of appeals applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency
of the evidence." Attachment 6.

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID ITS OWN WEIGHING.
This Court narrowed the issue on certiorari to one: "Whether the Court of Appeals
applied the correct standard of review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the
evidence." Attachment 6. The law on this issue is well-settled. When challenging
sufficiency-of-the-evidence, an appellant must marshal evidence supporting the
challenged finding and then demonstrate how, despite this evidence, the challenged
finding is against the clear weight of evidence. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat 2004 UT
72, Tf 69, 99 P.3d 801. Where the appellant has not marshaled the evidence, the appellate
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court does not review the claim, but assumes that all findings are supported by the
evidence. Id. at 70; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 19, 100 P.3d 1177.

In cases where an appellant has fully marshaled the evidence, which is not the case
here, the appellate court then reviews the challenged finding using a clearly erroneous
standard of review. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a). That means the reviewing court "must decide
that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the
record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). Where,
as in this case, the findings are based on demonstrative evidence, this Court is
"particularly reticent to second guess" such findings. In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest
Pipeline. 2004 UT 67, f 67, 98 P.3d 1.

The Pena case came to the Utah Supreme Court on certification from the court of
appeals to resolve the court of appeals's ongoing "confusion" regarding standard of
review. 869 P.2d at 935 & n.2. In response, this Court clarified its functional
jurisprudence of appellate review standards. Id. at 937-39. Pena outlined "a fixed
allocation of power and responsibility between the trial and appellate courts . . . regarding
questions of fact." Id. 869 P.2d at 938 (emphasis added). Pena held "it will never be

20030750-CA
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appropriate for an appellate court to overturn a trial court's factual determinations when
they have substantial record support." Id. Pena determined that a finding-of-fact review
was an area in which "the appellate court has a permanently limited role." Id. (emphasis
added).

Pena placed sufficiency-of-evidence reviews "at the extreme end of the discretion
spectrum." Id- at 938-39 (citing Professor Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 662-63 (1971).6

The court of appeals has, for the most part followed Pena when reviewing
challenged findings.7 Likewise, this Court has followed Pena, in particular, by chastising
6

The Rosenberg article can't be found on the Web or in the Matheson Courthouse
Library. It can be found in the stacks at the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
7

See e ^ , In re A.C.. 2004 UT App 255, If 12, 97 P.3d 706; In re ST.. 928 P.2d
393, 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (fact that evidence supports more than one result does not
justify reversal of finding); In re R.A.J.. 1999 UT App 329, f 12, 991 P.2d 1118
(responsibility of juvenile judge to hear, consider and weigh evidence); In re E.R., 918
P.2d 162, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing specialized expertise of juvenile
judges); In re G.V.. 916 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) Guvenile court's function to
weigh and assess credibility of expert testimony).
The cases that have not followed Pena are outstanding in their rarity as well as
their weigh-it-ourselves temerity. See e ^ , In re Z.D.. 2004 UT App 261, ^ 1 n.l & 19, 98
P.3d 40 (less deference given to bench finding, appropriate to determine whether clear
and convincing standard met, trial judge can't be expected to remember evidence in
multi-day trial); InreN.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, If 14 (re-weighing credibility
factors of Utah R. Evid. 803(24) to find the evidence "cut both ways"); In re V.K.S.. 2003
20030750-CA
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appellants for (1) not marshaling the evidence; (2) re-arguing only the favorable facts, and
(3) seeking a second opinion. Recently, this Court added a fourth transgression to the list:
(4) omitting "certain minor evidence, that in combination, could" support the finding.
Easy Heat at 2004 UT 72, f 71. See also Chen. 2004 UT 82 at 75-76 ("the requirements
of marshaling still do not appear to be understood with the sense of clarity and urgency
we desire").

In a major departure from Pena, the Z.D. opinion tacitly condoned all four of these
appellate shortcomings by reversing a fact-intensive finding in the face of (1) no
marshaling; (2) a re-arguing of only the favorable facts; (3) a bid for a second opinion;
and (4) an omission of minor, as well as major, evidence.8

In the present case, despite the clear language and despite the court of appeals's
normal adherence to Pena, the panel asserted that it need not resolve all conflicts in favor

UT App 13, Tf 7, 63 P.3d 1284 ("we must do our own weighing"); Davis v. Davis, 2001
UT App 225, Tf 6, 63 P.3d 676 (appellate court does its own weighing); In re T.H. v. R.HL
860 P.2d 370, 373 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Saddler. 2003 UT App 82, 67 P.3d 1025
(no deference to magistrate's ruling on affidavit), revjd, 2004 UT 105 (granting great
deference to magistrate).
8

Recently, this Court extended the duty to marshal to issues of law that are
"extremely fact-sensitive." Chen, 2004 UT 82 at % 20 (failure to marshal evidence
underlying facts supporting challenged legal issue proved "fatal" to legal argument).
20030750-CA
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of the trier of fact and it need not defer to a finding if it was judge-made and not jury
made. See Z.D. at ^j 19. True to its word, the Z.D. panel proceeded to re-weigh the
evidence and to make its own findings, without the benefit of marshaling, and without the
benefit of viewing the demonstrative evidence. As a result of its re-weighing, the panel
determined that the Child was injured on Wednesday by the Grandmother in the walker
incident and not by the Father on Saturday in a non-accidental manner.9

Thus, the court of appeals disregarded its own well-settled case law to secondguess the weight, credibility and interpretation of the evidence, including demonstrative
evidence. The question becomes whether the appellate panel had the authority to even
reach the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue where the evidence had not been marshaled.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ABANDONED
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT.

This Court has set forth the appropriate appellee response to a failure-to-marshalargue-the-favorable-facts brief: The appellee should point to a scintilla of evidence to
refute the claim of no evidence to marshal. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 80, 100 P.3d
9

The word "nonaccidental" is the operative term in determining whether an injury
amounts to abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(l)(a)(i) ("'Abused child' includes a
minor less than 18 years of age who has suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental
physical or mental harm, negligent treatment, or sexual exploitation.").
20030750-CA
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1177. This Court has held that an appellant may not shift the burden to the appellee to
marshal the evidence. Id. at ^ 78. Written and oral argument should be confined to
urging the court to decline to consider the claim and then, as a back up position, pointing
to a scintilla of evidence supporting the challenged finding.10

In turn, the appropriate appellate court response, the response requested by the
Guardian and the Assistant Attorney General in this case, is for this Court to "affirm the
court's findings on that basis alone." Id. at ]f 80. n

10

Here, the Guardian did just that, relying, to the detriment of her young clients, on
both appellate courts' instructions on handling a failure-to-marshal case. In fact, the
Guardian pointed out that she was prepared to argue the law, but felt it was inappropriate
to argue the facts before an appellate panel because the appellate court was required to
presume that the evidence supported the findings. Chen, 2004 UT 82 at 3; Harding v.
Bell 2002 UT 108, % 21, 57 P.3d 1093. A panel member disagreed, directing the
Guardian to argue the facts anyway.
11

This Court described the alternative appellate task where there is no marshaling
would be to comb through the record, assemble the evidence, identify how the trial court
used this evidence to support the challenged finding and then determine that the decision
was clearly erroneous. This Court described the task as a "colossal commitment of time
and resources." Chen, 2004 UT 82, at ^f 82 n.16. In this case, this Court would have to
comb through 879 pages of legal documents and exhibits and 1592 pages of transcripts.
Even then, this Court would not have access to the demonstrative evidence not reflected
in the transcripts. In re Water Rights v. Pinecrest Pipeline., 2004 UT 67, Tf 33, 92 P.3d 1
(appellate court "particularly reticent to second-guess findings based on demonstrative
evidence).
20030750-CA
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In the spirit of offering f,a scintilla of evidence that supports a court's findings,"
Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 82, and mindful that this is not the forum to argue the facts, the
following is offered to provide a representative example of where the panel relied to its
detriment on the Father's statement of facts, which statement was contradicted by the
record.

The Z.D. panel quoted only that portion of the Dr. Smith letter that was quoted out
of context in the Father's brief:
Smith wrote a letter dated December 11, 2002 in which he
explained that the fracture could result from the forceful
wedging of the leg over a fulcrum (as in the walker incident),
but that it would be "difficult to know the degree of force that
would be required to produce this fracture by this
mechanism."
Z.D. at Tf 9. This portion of the letter, when read in isolation and at first blush, appears to
support the Father's walker theory. In fact, the letter, which was later admitted in its
entirety over defense counsel's vehement objection, rejects the walker theory, as shown in
its concluding paragraph:
I feel that once this type of fracture occurred, given the
amount of displacement on the initial film, that we would
expect to have significant pain with activities such as diaper
changing or any manipulation of the limb. It is, therefore,
difficult to match the chronology of the fracture to the onset
of symptoms being approximately three days later.

20030750-CA
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Def. Exh. 15, Attachment 5.

Because the Father did not marshal the evidence and because the court of appeals
did not perform the "colossal commitment of time and resource" to comb through the
voluminous record, the court of appeals had no basis to reverse the fact-intensive finding
of abuse. Chen, 2004 UT 82 ^ 82 n.16.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals's opinion and should affirm the
juvenile court's adjudication order without remand to the appellate court because the
Z.D. panel abandoned the marshaling requirement and abandoned the concomitant
presumption that the record supports the findings. In addition, the Z.D. court did not
give due deference to the trier of fact who heard the witnesses, saw the demonstrative
evidence, chose among the experts and determined credibility and weight.
DATED this 17th day of January 2005.

MARTHA PIERCE
Guardian ad Litem

20030750-CA
20040837-SC

18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of January 2005,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to:
John M. Peterson
Carol L.C. Verdoia
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Sara Pfrommer
Attorney for Father
2663 Little Kate Road
Park City, UT 84060

MARTHA PIERCE
Guardian ad Litem

20030750-CA
20040837-SC

19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ATTACHMENTS

1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree, entered August 19, 2003. Supp. R.
879.
2. In re Z.D. and A.D.. 2004 UT App 261.
3. June 12, 2003 Affidavit of Dr. Bruce Herman. State's Exh. 39.
4. Letter from Bruce Herman, M.D., Karen Hansen, M.D. and Lori D. Frasier, M.D.
dated December 17, 2002. State's Exh. 7.
5. John T. Smith letter dated December 11, 2002. Def. Ex. 15.
6. Utah Supreme Court Order granting certiorari dated December 22,2004.

20030750-CA
20040837-SC

20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ATTACHMENT 1
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE,
AUGUST 19, 2003
Supp. R. 879.
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An

tea

the Third District Juvenile Court
Saii: Lake County/ State of Utah

j :t5Lc of Utah/ iriLerest of
Dunsmore, Alexis
Dunsmore, Zachary

bindings-of Fact, Conclus.ions 1
of Law, and Decree

9-19-2000
4-6-2002

' Persons under eighteen years

Case Ivos. 153373, 169372

The above matter came before this Court for trial on 3-21,
3-24, 4-21, 5-i, 5-2, 5-6, 5-3, 5-12, 5-19, 5-21, 5-27, 6-11, and
6-12 of 2003, pursuant to the State's Verified Petition filed 1122-2062.
The State was represented by Amy Jackson, Assistant
Attorney General; the Office of Guardian ad Litem was represented
by Kobert Parrish, attorney at law; the mother, Lisa Dunsmore,
was present and represented by Ronald Wilkinson, attorney at law;
the father, Stephen Dunsmore, a.k.a. Brig Dunsmore, was present
and represented by Blake Nakamura, attorney at law.
Having now considered the testimony of witnesses, reviewed
the numerous exhibits, and listened to arguments of counsel,
and/or, read the closing arguments submitted at counsel's option,
the Court finds and concludes that the State has proven its
Verified Petition of 11-22-2002 by clear and convincing evidence
in the following particulars, and makes the following
Findings of Fact:
1. That the parents of the above named children are
Stephen, a.k-a- Brig, and Lisa Dunsmore, who reside in West
Jordan, Utah;
2. That on or about 11-17-2002, Zachary, a seven (7) month
old, non-ambulatory child, was admitted to the Primary Children's
Medical Center suffering from a fractured femur;
3.

not

The fractured femur was due to non-accidental trauma and

self-inflicted;

4. The femur fracture suffered by the child occurred at a
tiute when he was under the direct and exclusive care and control
of his father, Stephen, a.k.3. Brig, Dunsmore;
5. The explanations as to the cause of the injury provided
by the parents is inconsistent with the medical testimony;
5, ^-Initial skeletal surveys taken upon the child*'s
V.rten->s
itai, also revealed a possible skull
admission zzo >_r.e noso
fr.icture to the child's head. Subsequent additional tests v/er<
performed on the child's skull to definitively answer if there

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vr7<2

?f-ge : W G

wc<s a skull fracture; but the medical experts could not reach a
consensus on the issue. However, from the evidence presented,
the Court is convinced there was a skull fracture, and not an
afsociated suture as the parents aver. Nonetheless, neither the
source nor the cause of the skull fracture is known or suggested,
and it has not been established whether it was accidental or nonaccidental in nature. Neither has it bsen established in whose
care and control the child was under when the alleged skull
fiacture occurred nor when it may have occurred. These issues
axe all problematic and/ therefore, the Court finds the evidence
if: inconclusive and insufficient to conclude that the skull
fiacture was the result of neglect or abuse by either parent.
Court's Commentary:
This has been a most difficult case, not only because of its
length, but because of the complex factual and legal issues
piesented. The Court is not insensitive to the emotions of all
parties involved in the trial of this matter. The Court ascribes
no ill-will toward either parent in making its findings. The
issue at trial has never been about the character of the parents
nor about their love for their children. The Court senses the
love the parents have for their children. Rather, the facts
dictate the Court's findings and conclusions.
Through a rather protracted proceeding, the Court has been
handed a State's case built primarily on medical, communicative,
and circumstantial evidence. The parents' cases are also built
around medical testimony coupled with an explanation as to the
instrumentality involved, what the parents said and did, but alsoon circumstantial evidence. Not surprisingly in this type of
case, there has been no testimony from any eyewitnesses who
allegedly observed how the leg injury occurred. Rather, the
Court is left with attempts £o reconstruct what happened from
medical experts/ and from testimony by persons close to the
events as they developed.
The parents claim neither any personal knowledge nor provide
any explanation as to the source of the injury. However, the
grandmother recalls the child's leg getting caught in an infant
"walker" on Wednesday, 11-13-2002. As she attempted to place the
child into the ''-walker", the child let out a shrill cry. In her
efforts to extract the child's leg from the "walker", she asserts
that she must have caused the femur to fracture during that
event. She demonstrated to medical staff and in the court
setting how she must have accidentally or inaiverdentiy caused
the fracture to the leg. Hers is the only explanation provided
the Court as to the source of the fractured fenur from any of the
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parties.
Medical experts testified and generally agreed that the pal
arc the symptoms attendant to the leg fracture would be
significant and that the fracture would be extremely painful to
the child. According to the medical testimony, symptoms of
fiissiness/ irritability, sensitivity to touch, inability to bear
weight on the injured leg, crying, and general discomfort would
aJi be expected to be present from the moment of initial
infliction of the injury, and would persist in greater or lesser
degree depending upon the type of activity exerted on the child.
Daily changing of diapers, clothing, bathing, handling of child
for naps, being held by parent or others, being transported in a
car, being placed in and out of a car seat, etc., are all routine
activities which would be noticably affected by the child's
response to the pain of the injury, and are readily detectable
and observable by a caretaker.
From Wednesday, 11-13, to Saturday, 11-16, neither the
mother nor the grandmother noticed any unusual, or out-of-the
ordinary, stress, pain or discomfort to the child. The
grandmother described the child as being comforted by her within
three (3) to five (5) seconds after the shrill" cry, and he
appeared fine for the rest of the day. He remained in the
"walker" and she noticed no swelling or pain in his leg. She
testified she checked his leg and observed nothing out of the
ordinary and she stated he exhibited no discomfort. She said the
child was handled in and out of a car seat without distress. To
her, everything seemed normal with the child.
The mother testified the child exhibited no more than usual
or ordinary fussiness on Thursday, 11-14, or Friday, 11-15,
although the child did have flu shots on Friday. Sven on the
morning of Saturday, 11-16, she* fed the child, played and talked
with, him, even placed him in the "walker" and removed him again
when he got fussy, and placed him on the floor in a vburrito'#/
wrap (a word used to describe the method of firmly wrapping a
blanket around an infant). She stated he .appeared normal and
fine when she went shopping with her mom (grandmother), and left
him in the care of his father, Steve or Brig, Dunsmore. While
shopping, she called home about three (3) times to check on the
child, and nothing out of the ordinary was reported.by the
father. When she arrived home in the evening about six p.m., or
shortly thereafter, the child was on the floor on a blanket. She
picked him up, interacted with him, and held him on her lap. She
noticed his left leg appeared a bit bent, so she rubbed it
thinking it was cue to the flu shot. It was then she noticed he
did not want to stand on his left leg. As his symptoms worsened,
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the father took him to Primary Children's Medical Center for
examination on Sunday, 11-17. Subsequently, the child was
admitted to the hospital with a fractured femur.
The Court has received testimony from numerous doctors,
fcjuily members, and others. Where permitted or allowed, each has
rendered an opinion. Many of the expert witnesses were called in
aj'ter the fact, so to speak, to assist in possibly explaining
what could have happened, and what the possible
instrumentality
may have been which caused the leg injury.
The chief attending physician on duty at the time of the
admission of the child, unequivocally testified that the femur
fracture was the result of"non-accidental-trauma, and would have
required significant and excessive force to cause such a complex
femur fracture- The same attending physician observed the
demonstration by the grandmother of the "walker" as the possible
instrument and he medically discounted it as the source of
injury. His opinion was supported by several other physicians,
all experienced 3nd trained in diagnosing and treating cases of
suspected
child abuse, or non-accidental trauma. Several of
these doctors currently serve on the child abuse protection ream
at the Primary Children's Medical Center,
Assuming for the sake of argument that the source of the
injury was the *walker", then one has to assume it (the injury)
occurred on Wednesday/ ii-13-2002, as described by the
grandmother, and as asserted by both parents. The father
describes symptoms as suddenly appearing in the afternoon of
Saturday, 11-16. The father testified he saw little of the child
on either Wednesday, 11-13, or Thursday, 11-14, or Friday, 11-15,
because he got home from work after the child had been put to bed
for the night. As described by the father, and confirmed by the
hospital physicians and other doctors, the attendant symptoms of
the leg fracture were significant, and the doctors testified that
the symptoms would be present from the initial receipt of rhe
injury on Wednesday, and persist on Thursday, Friday, and
Saturday until hospitalization, which occurred on Sunday, 11-17.
However, the testimony from the mother and grandmother, the two
persons who almost exclusively spent Wednesday,- Thursday, and
Friday with the child, does not reveal any observations of the
expected symptoms in the child. Not even on Saturday morning was
there a mention of concern for the child's behavior or any
symptoms out of the ordinary. Those symptoms were first noticed
by the mother on Saturday evening upon her return home from
slopping when she interacted with the child. It was then she
realized he favored his left leg and would not bear weight on It.
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The Court is borh astonished and dumbfounded why the
symptoms would be absent on Wednesday, 11-13, Thursday, 11-14,
Friday, 11-15, and on Saturday morning of the 16th, but yet make
such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of
the same day, Saturday, 11-16, after being in the sole care of
the father all day.
The parents assert that any number of drugs, among them
Tylenol and Ibuprofen, may have masked the symptoms. However,
the Court is not persuaded that the minimal doses of minor pain
killers as mentioned in the testimony would mask the symptoms
attendant to the child's femur fracture. Additionally, it is
asserted, by the mother particularly, that she used extreme
caution and care in her handling of the child while bathing him,
changing his diapers, changing is clothes, etc-, thus perhaps
masking any symptoms the child may otherwise have exhibited such
that they could not be readily detected by either parent.
Further, they assert that even the administration of the flu
shots to his leg must have been done with such great care as to
mask any possible detection by medical personnel, a nurse and a
doctor, of symptoms from the supposed Wednesday fracture. To
this Court, that is inconceivable and not believable.
If the "walker" was the source and instrumentality of the
leg fracture then, according to medical testimony, the symptoms
attendant with such injury would have been present on Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday, and on Saturday morning as they were on
Saturday evening, or late afternoon that day. As well-intended
as the grandmother's explanation may be, the Court discounts her
story as the source of the leg fractureThe Court is convinced that the leg fracture occurred on
Saturday, 11-16, during the time he was in his father's care.
Unfortunately, the details of how the child received the femur
fracture has not been provided to the Court but sufficient and
clear and convincing evidence has been established for the Court
to conclude it was non-accidental trauma without a reasonable and
acceptable explanation from either parent as to its causation.
UCA 78-3a-305.1, provides:
"In determining whether a minor is an abused child or
neglected child it may be presumed that the person having the
minor under his direct and exclusive care and control at"the time
of the abuse is responsible for the abuse or r.eglect." See State
ex rel L,M, v. State, 2001 U? App. 314, 37 ?,3d 115?.
This presumption is rebuttable, but the Court finds that m e
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Pare six
father has failed to rebut it. Having rejected the grandmother's
explanation that the incident which broke the child''s leg
occurred on Wednesday, 11-13, via the ^walker", the legal
presumption applies to the father as he had the child M*..under
his direcr and exclusive care and control at the time of the
abuse.,.", and is therefore legally responsible for the abuse
and/or neglect.
As to the skull line discovered on x-rays taken of the
child/ the Court is convinced that it is the result of a fracture
and not an associated suture. The Court is persuaded, by Dr.
Nixon's years of experience in the field and finds his testimony
and opinion believable and more credible than the other experts
who testified. In any event, the Court has already concluded the
evidence is not clear and convincing that the skull fracture was
non-accidental in nature.
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court enters the following
Conclusions of Law:
1. That said child, Zachary, is an Mabused child'' in that
he has suffered non-accidental physical harm, or negligent
treatment, pursuant to UCA 73-3a-i03(l) fa) (I);
2- That said child, Zachary, is a neglected child in that
he has been subjected to mistreatment or abuse, pursuant to UCA
73-3a-103(l) (s) (i) (3);
3. That said child, Alexis, is a neglected child in that
she is at risk of being a neglected or abused child because
another child in the same home is a neglected or abused child,
pursuant to UCA 73~3a-(l) (s) (1) (S) .
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court enters the following
Decree:
1.

That this matter is set for a dispositional hearing on
, before Judge Nolan, at the Sandy
Courthouse, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah;
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2. Thar the Division of Child and Family Services is
directed to submit a written reunification service plan for r>oth
parents for the Court's consideration, and that copies be
provided to Court and counsel five (5) days prior to the hearing
date scheduled above;
2. That previously conducted psychological evaluations of
both parents be made available for the Court's consideration at
the dispositional hearing;
4. Previous orders regarding custody, guardianship, and
visitation shall remain as ordered pending further review and
order of the Court.
Dated this l'5r\fdaj/ of Aucust, 2003,

B l a k ^ N ^ ^ & r ^ ^ a ^ o ^ e ^ a t law
Ron wYlki^s^>^^tttc^^^at law
Stephen anh'^Jbthfel^liK^rfbre, parents
Amy Jackson, ''frMau£e?*of Attorney General
P.ob Parrish, Office of Guardian ad Litem
Division of Child and Family Services
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ATTACHMENT 2
In re Z.D. and A.D..
2004 UTApp 261.
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2004 UTApp 261, *; 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 25;
2004 Utah App. LEXIS 82, * *
State of Utah, in the interest of Z.D. and A.D., persons under eighteen years of age. S.B.D.
and L.D., Appellants, v. State of Utah, Appellee.
Case No. 20030750-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
2004 UTApp 261; 505 Utah Adv. Rep. 25; 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 82

July 29, 2004, Filed
NOTICE: [**1] THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE PUBLICATION IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTER.
PRIOR HISTORY: Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department. The Honorable Olof A.
Johansson.
DISPOSITION: Reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department (Utah),
determined that one of appellant parents1 children suffered a femur fracture while in
the father's care, and concluded the child was abused and neglected while in the father's
care, and that another was a neglected child as a result of being in the same home. The
children were removed from the home. The parents appealed the adjudication,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
OVERVIEW: After the infant child was seen at a hospital, abuse was suspected and
reported. The juvenile court determined that sufficient clear and convincing evidence had
been established to conclude the child's broken leg was a non-accidental trauma without
a reasonable acceptable explanation from either parent as to its causation. On appeal,
the father argued the juvenile court erred in finding the State established abuse by clear
and convincing evidence. None of the expert witnesses could provide an opinion as to
how much force would be required to cause the fracture with either an axial load or a
walker incident. Noticeably removed from the court's findings was any mention of, or
explanation for, the absence of external injuries. If the fracture were caused by an axial
load, the mechanism believed by some State witnesses to be the probable cause, it
would almost always be accompanied by a soft tissue injury like bruising or swelling. The
appellate court could not say that, given the evidence presented, the trier of facts could
reasonably conclude that it was highly probable that the fracture was the result of
nonaccidental trauma inflicted by the father.
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed.
CORE TERMS: fracture, walker, symptom, leg, doctor, femur, axial, knee, bone, caretaker,
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probable, trauma, fussy, left leg, nonaccidental, afternoon, leverage, swelling, bruising,
morning, dose, load, pain, demonstration, teething, noticed, burrito, wrap, trier, clear and
convincing evidence
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Substantial Evidence Review^

tf^iThe
standard for assessing whether evidence is "clear and convincing" has been
articulated as follows: While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine
whether the evidence is clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily
conclusive, for in cases governed by the rule requiring such evidence the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the finding should be considered by the appellate court
in the light of that rule. In such cases it is the duty of the appellate court in
reviewing the evidence to determine, not whether the trier of facts could
reasonably conclude that it is more probable that the fact to be proved exists than
that it does not, but whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it is
highly probable that the fact exists. More Like This Headnote
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Review^!
HN2

±An appellate court does not give factual determinations made by a trial judge the
same amount of deference given to factual determinations made by a jury — that
is, an appellate court does not, as a matter of course, resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the appellee. More Like This Headnote

COUNSEL: Sara Pfrommer, Park City, for Appellants.
Mark L Shurtleff and John M. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Martha Pierce and Robert N. Parrish, Salt Lake City, Guardians Ad Litem.
JUDGES: Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Thorne. Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge and
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge, concur.
OPINIONBY: Russell W. Bench
OPINION: OPINION (For Official Publication)
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge:
[*P1] S.B.D. and L.D. (Father and Mother) challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court's determination that Z.D., one of their children, suffered a
femur fracture while in Father's care. After receiving evidence, n l the court determined
that "sufficient and clear and convincing evidence has been established . . . to conclude it
was non-accidental trauma without a reasonable and acceptable explanation from either
parent as to its causation." We reverse.
Footnotes

n l The trial court received evidence on thirteen different days, spanning the time from March
21, 2003 to June 12, 2003. Undoubtedly, this elongated trial made it difficult for the trial
judge to recall the evidence and to place it all in context.
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End Footnotes

[**2]

BACKGROUND
[*P2] Father took care of his infant son, Z.D., and two-year-old daughter, A.D., for most of
the day on Saturday, November 16, 2002, while Mother was away from the home. Early that
morning, before leaving, Mother gave Z.D. a dose of Tylenol for the earache, constipation,
and teething that Z.D. had been experiencing in the days prior. He was not given another
dose of Tylenol until later that evening. Z.D. took a nap in the afternoon. When Z.D. awoke,
he was fussy, and Father noticed that he was favoring his left leg by holding his foot up so
that it did not touch Father's lap. Father laid Z.D. in his lap and rubbed the leg because
Father thought the flu shot Z.D. had received on Friday, November 15, 2002, was bothering
him. Z.D. did not like having his leg rubbed and continued to be fussy. Father wrapped him
up tightly in what the parents called a "burrito wrap" and held him. Z.D. stopped being fussy
and appeared comfortable. When Mother returned home that evening, she also noticed that
Z.D. was favoring his left leg. Mother and Father attributed Z.D.'s favoring of his left leg to
the flu shot, but called Kids Care just to be sure. Kids Care reassured them that [**3]
there
was no need to worry, and that Z.D. did not need to be examined. That night Z.D. slept
normally and did not display fussiness indicative of pain.
[*P3] On Sunday morning, November 17, 2002, when Z.D. continued to favor his left leg,
Father took him to Primary Children's Medical Center (Primary) to be examined. The first
doctor at Primary to examine Z.D. moved his leg around some, but could not find anything
wrong. Another doctor came and placed Z.D. on an examination table. The second doctor
pushed Z.D.'s legs up against his torso, straightened and bent his legs, and wiggled and
moved them around. Z.D. cried fairly intensely. After Z.D.'s leg was x-rayed, Father was told
that Z.D.'s left femur was fractured just above the knee. Z.D. was described by hospital
workers as cheerful, interactive, alert, and slightly fussy, but consolable. At some point, Z.D.
was examined by Dr. Bridgette Sipher. Sipher noted that Z.D. was in no apparent distress
except when his left leg was manipulated. Additionally, there was no bruising anywhere on
Z.D.'s body, and no fever, redness, or swelling. Sipher recommended Tylenol or ibuprofen for
pain, with Lortab to be considered if necessary. [**4]
Although there was decreased
movement in Z.D.'s left leg, Z.D. was still moving it independently.
[*P4] In accordance with Primary's policy to notify the State whenever a fracture is
discovered in a nonambulatory child, the emergency room staff immediately notified the
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS). n2 The emergency room staff also notified the
Center for Safe and Healthy Families, a group at Primary responsible for identifying and
investigating suspected cases of child abuse. Dr. Bruce Herman, a pediatrician and member
of the Center for Safe and Healthy Families team7 took charge of the investigation and
examined Z.D. at Primary the following day, Monday, November 18, 2002. After interviewing
Father and Mother, Herman concluded that Z.D. had become acutely symptomatic on
Saturday, November 16, which would be consistent with the fracture occurring on that day.
He also opined that the mechanism causing the fracture would most likely be excessive axial
loading of the femur, and that the parents offered no history providing such a mechanism.
Footnotes

- -

n2 Because of the abuse referral, Z.D. was admitted to the hospital.

End Footnotes
[**5]
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[*P5] Because Father was employed by DCFS as an in-home child welfare worker, DCFS
retained an independent investigator, Paul Dean, to conduct an investigation of the
circumstances surrounding Z.D.'s fracture. Dean first saw Z.D. at Primary. Z.D. was wearing
only a diaper, shirt, and fabric splint on his left leg. No marks were visible on Z.D.'s exposed
body parts. When Dean interviewed Father and Mother, neither of them could provide an
explanation consistent with the mechanism Dr. Herman had described.
[*P6] On Tuesday, November 19, 2002, Mother, Father, and Z.D.'s grandparents were at
the hospital when Herman stopped by the hospital room. Mother's mother (Grandmother)
asked Dr. Herman whether the fracture could have occurred during an incident with a
baby walker on the previous Wednesday, November 13, 2002, where Z.D.'s leg became stuck
in the walker and Grandmother released his leg by pulling it through the hole of the walker.
Herman did not acknowledge the question and, instead, continued to talk. Grandmother
asked the same question again. Herman continued to write on his notepad and then left the
room. The next day, Grandmother again posed the walker question [**6]
to Herman, who
then said that the walker incident was not a possible cause of the fracture. He did not follow
up on Grandmother's question at that time. n3
Footnotes

n3 During trial, when asked about his response to Grandmother's inquiry, Herman testified
that he did not feel that the walker incident would have created the appropriate mechanism,
or the appropriate kind of force, to cause the fracture.

End Footnotes

[*P7] Later, on December 11, 2003, the family requested a meeting with Herman and
other members of the Center for Safe and Healthy Families in order to present the walker
incident as a possible mechanism for the fracture. Grandmother gave a demonstration of
how she had tried to place Z.D. in his walker, but his left leg became stuck, his knee bent
with his foot behind him. In her attempt to extricate his wedged leg, she placed her left hand
and thumbs on his left leg above his knee and pushed, and then pulled his foot down through
the hole of the walker with her right hand. Z.D. let out a shrill, vigorous cry, but [**7]
calmed down within fifteen seconds.
[*P8] In a separate meeting, after Grandmother demonstrated the walker incident, the
Primary doctors met and agreed that their opinions were unchanged by the demonstration.
Kari Cunningham, Primary's liaison to DCFS and a child protective services worker with DCFS,
was present at the meeting with the doctors. She observed that the doctors agreed that
someone could have caused the fracture using their hand, but that the force involved in the
walker incident would not have been sufficient to cause the fracture. Cunningham testified
that, in discussing the mechanism and forces involved, the doctors did not discuss the
medications Z.D. had been taking, the fact that he was often placed in a burrito wrap, and
Z.D.'s activities in the days between Wednesday and Saturday.
[*P9] Dr. G. William Nixon, a pediatric radiologist at Primary, did not participate in this
meeting. Nixon had earlier opined that the fracture was not caused by direct axial loading,
consistent with Herman's opinion, but rather was caused by angular leverage. Dr. John
Smith, a pediatric orthopedist at Primary, was also not present during the walker
demonstration on [**8]
December 11, 2002, but was consulted via telephone. Smith wrote
a letter dated December 11, 2002 in which he explained that the fracture could result from
the forceful wedging of the leg over a fulcrum (as in the walker incident), but that it would be
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"difficult to know the degree of force that would be required to produce this fracture by this
mechanism."
[*P10] At trial, Herman elucidated his position regarding the possible mechanism of the
fracture:
We [the doctors] all agreed that that [the walker incident] would not be the
typical mechanism or the one we would usually see to explain that fracture and
I certainly have not said that that would have been impossible to be the
mechanism. I have that — and it's still my opinion that it was unlikely that that
was the mechanism.

In clarifying his view, Herman said that while the walker incident was a possible mechanism
for the fracture, it was not the likely mechanism. As to whether he significantly disagreed
with Nixon as to the mechanism of the fracture, he answered, "Significant is a word — I
mean we had disagreements about the actual mechanism that could have caused this but
would I describe [**9] them as significant? No, sir."
[*P11] On cross-examination, Dean said it would have been important for him to know
whether there was a disagreement among the doctors as to the probable mechanism of the
fracture; however, Dean was not made aware of the differing opinions. Dean also testified
that he did not know, and did not consider the fact, that Z.D. had been taking Tylenol
between the time of the walker incident and when he entered the emergency room on
Sunday morning. Nor was Dean aware that Z.D. had been suffering from constipation and an
earache, had been teething during that time period, and had received a flu shot on Friday.
Dean admitted that all of these factors would have been important for him to know.
• [*P12] In his testimony, Herman identified three factors to be considered in investigating
Z.D.'s fracture: 1) the type of fracture, which helps to determine the mechanism and force;
2) the age of the fracture; and 3) the symptoms associated with the fracture. He explained
that, taken together, these factors demonstrated that Z.D.'s femur fracture was the result
of nonaccidental trauma inflicted on Saturday, November 16, rather than the walker
incident [**10] on Wednesday, November 13.
[*P13] As to mechanism, Herman testified that he was "51/49" percent certain that the
fracture was caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent knee. As to the force,
Herman thought it unlikely that the walker couldgenerate the forces required to fracture
the femur. As to the age of the fracture, both Wednesday (the date of the walker incident)
and Saturday (the date Herman noted Z.D. manifested symptoms), fit within the time period
identified as when the fracture could have occurred. As to the type and timing of symptoms,
Herman thought that if the walker incident had been the cause of the fracture, then Mother
and Father would have noticed symptoms of a broken leg prior to Saturday. Herman
maintained that symptoms of a broken leg would have been apparent, especially when Z.D.'s
leg was moved during daily activities like diaper changes and clothing changes. Regardless of
Z.D.'s teething, earache, constipation, taking of Tylenol, absence of external injuries, and the
fact that he was often tightly swaddled in a burrito wrap, which mimicked a splint, Herman
doubted that the symptoms of a broken leg could be hidden from a vigilant
caretaker [**11] from Wednesday to Saturday.
[*P14] Mother and Father called a number of witnesses. David Ingebretsen, an expert in
the field of bio-mechanical engineering, testified that the fracture pattern was consistent
with the forces identified by the walker incident. Debbie Hosseini, a registered nurse who
works with the early intervention program helping premature babies with their development,
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had come to Z.D.'s home every month to observe him. She testified that he was a very
happy baby, always smiling, and very easy to console. She never saw any bruising or
swelling on Z.D.
[*P15] Finally, Dr. Steven Scott, an expert in pediatric orthopedics, gave extensive
testimony. Scott testified that the femur fracture did not follow the typical pattern of
nonaccidental trauma, and he disagreed with Herman as to the probable mechanism. After
examining the fracture pattern, and feeling that it did not fit the typical pattern that is
normally seen with nonaccidental trauma, he wanted to know if there was an explanation for
the fracture that fit the fracture pattern. Scott believed that the fracture pattern required
a marriage of two forces in the same mechanism. He thought that Grandmother's [**12]
walker demonstration "mimicked the forces exactly that would be needed to produce the
fracture pattern." As to the force, he testified that there is no real way to know how much
force is required to break a bone on a particular person, but the walker incident created a
leverage force, and leverage forces create great force when little force is applied.
Additionally, the area of the bone where the fracture occurred was a weaker area of the
femur, and Z.D.'s delayed bone age gave him a weaker bone because it had less mass and
was composed of immature woven bone, making it structurally weak.
[*P16] In discussing the symptoms of a fracture, Scott agreed with Herman that bone
pain is typically worse with any kind of manipulation or movement, but thought that in a child
of Z.D.'s age, symptoms would be more generalized fussiness, irritability, crying, and lack of
movement of his leg. He also explained that wrapping Z.D. in a burrito wrap would influence
a caretaker's ability to detect symptoms because swaddling is exactly what happens when a
child has a splint. Scott's opinion as to the onset of symptoms was also different from
Herman's. Scott did not find it remarkable for three [**13] days to elapse before Mother
and Father noticed symptoms of the fracture. As examples, Scott said that in the eighteen
years he had been involved in taking care of children's fractures, it was not uncommon to
see even a verbal child brought in two or three days after the injury because the parents
attributed the symptoms to something else. He had also seen nonverbal children who had
fractures for days, or even more than a week, before caretakers (or medical professionals)
realized there was a problem that required medical attention. Scott pointed to the numerous
physicians who examined Z.D. at Primary and described him as cheerful, interactive, alert,
and fussy, but consolable. At the hospital, Z.D. presented neither localized nor generalized
symptoms. Further, at least six physical examinations of Z.D. specifically noted that there
were no skin lesions, bruises, lacerations, abrasions, burns, or scars. Scott concluded that if
the mechanism that caused the fracture were a direct force, as Herman believed it to be,
then he would expect bruising around the leg because the force it takes to bruise soft tissues
is less than the force it takes to break a bone. OQ the other hand, with the [**14] walker
incident, the amount of force needed to be applied to the skin in order for the femur to
fracture, is well below the amount required to bruise the skin. He also cited a study where
over ninety percent of the children with suspected nonaccidental fractures also had soft
tissue injuries.
[*P17] After receiving all of the evidence, the juvenile court found that Herman
"unequivocally testified that the femur fracture was the result of non-accidental trauma,
and would have required significant and excessive force to cause such a complex femur
fracture." The court was convinced that the fracture occurred on Saturday when Z.D. was
in Father's care because the court was both "astonished and dumbfounded" as to why the
symptoms would be absent on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and on Saturday morning, "but
yet make such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of the same day."
[*P18] The court concluded that Z.D. was abused and neglected while in Father's care, and
that A.D. was a neglected child as a result of being in the same home as Z.D. See Utah Code
Ann. 5 78-3a-103(l)(sHi?(E? (2002). Z.D. and A.D. were removed from [**15] the home.
The court ordered DCFS to submit a reunification service plan. n4 Father and Mother appeal
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the trial court's adjudication.
Footnotes

n4 Father and Mother successfully completed their service plan. DCFS involvement was
eventually terminated, and the children were returned to the custody of Father and Mother
without condition.

End FootnotesISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[*P19] Father argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that the State established
abuse by clear and convincing evidence. See Utah R. Juv. P. 41(b). HN1Tfhe standard for
assessing whether evidence is "clear and convincing" has been articulated as follows:
While it rests primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence is
clear and convincing, its finding is not necessarily conclusive, for in cases
governed by the rule requiring such evidence the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the finding should be considered by the appellate court in the light of
that rule. . . . In such cases it is the duty of the appellate court [**16] in
reviewing the evidence to determine, not whether the trier of facts could
reasonably conclude that it is more probable that the fact to be proved exists
than that it does not, . . . but whether the trier of facts could reasonably conclude
that it is highly probable that the fact exists.

Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955)
(quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). HN2^nfKn appellate court does not give
factual determinations made by a trial judge the same amount of deference given to factual
determinations made by a jury — that is, an appellate court does not, as a matter of course,
resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the appellee." Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d
1282, 1284 n.2 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Type of Fracture
[*P20] Even disregarding the testimony of defense witnesses Ingebretsen and Scott, who
both testified that the fracture pattern was consistent with the forces identified by the
walker incident, the remaining evidence presented varying opinions as to the probable
mechanism. n5 Contrary to the court's finding, Herman's testimony [**17] was anything
but "unequivocal." He testified that he could only be "51/49" percent certain that the
fracture was caused by a significant axial force applied to a bent knee. This testimony,
standing alone, is far from clear and convincing. Further, neither one of the State's own
witnesses — Smith and Nixon — bolstered the opinion of Herman. Although Smith refrained
from estimating the degree of force required, he thought the fracture could have resulted
from the walker incident. Nixon thought the probable cause of the fracture was angular
leverage.
Footnotes
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n5 Scott agreed that an axial load could cause such a fracture. He described two possible
scenarios: 1) the child stands with locked knees and is then slammed down or dropped, so
that the force passes through the feet and into the knee and femur; and 2) the child
experiences a blow to the end of the knee, directly over the kneecap. He explained that the
first instance was unlikely because Z.D., as a nonambulatory child, did not have the muscle
tone to stand and lock his knees. Additionally, the fracture pattern did not match that
scenario. The second instance was unlikely because a direct blow strong enough to fracture
a bone should leave a contusion, swelling, or welt over the kneecap. Again, the fracture
pattern was not consistent with such a mechanism.

End Footnotes

[**18]
[*P21] As explained by both Scott and Ingebretsen, and uncontested by any of the State's
witnesses, if the mechanism causing the fracture is assumed to be the result of an axial
load, then more force would be required to cause the fracture than would be required by the
leverage force created by the walker incident. None of the expert witnesses could provide an
opinion as to how much force would be required to cause the fracture with either an axial
load or the walker incident.
II. Age of Fracture
[*P22] Both Wednesday and Saturday fall within the time period identified by the experts
as to when the fracture likely occurred; thus, this factor does not help to establish that the
fracture occurred on Saturday.
III. Symptoms Associated with Fracture
[*P23] There was a great deal of conflicting evidence associated with the type and timing
of symptoms. The court was "both astonished and dumbfounded" as to why the symptoms
would be absent on Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday morning, and "yet make
such a sudden and demonstrative appearance on the afternoon of the same day." Yet, the
court also recognized that Father saw very little of Z.D. on Wednesday, [**19] Thursday,
and Friday, so that when the symptoms seemed to Father to "suddenly appear" on Saturday,
Father had no way of comparing the symptoms exhibited on Saturday with the symptoms
exhibited in the days prior. Further, the court didjiot acknowledge that Mother had given
Z.D. regular doses of Tylenol on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, with the last dose being
given at approximately 4:00-5:00 a.m. on Saturday. Even then, the court was not persuaded
that "minimal doses of minor pain killers" could mask Z.D.'s symptoms. Yet, the State's
witness, Sipher, testified that Tylenol may very well influence whether a caretaker is able to
detect symptoms of an injury. Herman testified that children with fractures are prescribed
something stronger than Tylenol or ibuprofen for pain, and he was surprised to find that the
emergency department had initially given Z.D. only Tylenol after discovering the fracture.
[*P24] The court found that "medical experts testified and generally agreed that the pain
and the symptoms attendant to the leg fracture would be significant and that the fracture
would be extremely painful"; further, that the symptoms would be "readily detectable and
observable [**20] by a caretaker." Yet the court made no mention of Sipher's testimony
that it would not be surprising for the caretakers to attribute Z.D.'s fussiness to teething.
Defense witness, Scott, testified that, in his eighteen years of treating children's fractures, it
was not uncommon for nonverbal children, in the charge of medical professionals, to go for
days, or even a week, after sustaining a fracture before receiving treatment because the
medical professionals did not realize that a fracture had occurred. The court found that
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Father described Z.D.'s symptoms as significant, and that the hospital physicians and other
doctors confirmed this description. Yet, Scott pointed to the medical reports from Primary
itself, wherein Z.D. was described as cheerful, interactive, alert, and fussy, but consolable.
Even when the first doctor at Primary examined Z.D. and moved his leg, he could not find
anything wrong.
[*P25] Perhaps the most significant symptom was the one not present. Noticeably
removed from the court's findings and the State's case entirely, is any mention of, or
explanation for, the absence of external injuries. Z.D. sustained no lesions, welts, bruising,
swelling, redness, [**21] burns, abrasions, lacerations, or scars. If the fracture were
caused by an axial load, the mechanism believed by some State witnesses to be the probable
cause, it would almost always be accompanied by a soft tissue injury like bruising or swelling.
[*P26] Because the "explanations as to the cause of the injury provided by the parents
[was] inconsistent with the medical testimony,w the court determined that clear and
convincing evidence had established that the fracture occurred on Saturday afternoon while
Z.D. was in Father's care. However, we cannot say that, given the evidence presented, "the
trier of facts could reasonably conclude that it [was] highly probable" that the fracture was
the result of nonaccidental trauma inflicted by Father on Saturday afternoon. Lovett v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1955).
CONCLUSION
[*P27] The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Z.D.'s fracture was
caused by an axial load sometime on Saturday when he was in Father's care.
[*P28] We therefore reverse.
Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, [**22]
Presiding Judge
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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AMY A. JACKSON - #5724
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF- #4666
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
PO BOX 140833
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0833
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
j AFFIDAVIT OF DR. BRUCE
.' HERMAN
DUNSMORE, ALEXIS
(09/19/00)
DUNSMORE, ZACHARY
(04/06/02)
j Case No. 169373,169372
Child(ren) under 18 years of age.

? Judge Johansson

I, Dr. Bruce Herman, state under oath, as follows:
1. I met with Lisa and Brig Dunsmore, on both November 18* and 19th, 2002, at Primary
Children's Medical Center. I also talked briefly with the maternal grandmother, Linda Johnson,
onNovernberl9,2003.
2. I do not believe that Lisa Dunsmore asked me on November 18th or 19* whether
Zachary's leg fracture could have been caused in a baby walker. The first time I heard mention
of a walker as a possible cause of the broken leg was on November 19,2002, when the maternal
grandmother, Linda Johnson, asked me if Zachary's leg being caught in a baby walker could
have caused the fracture. No other details were offered at that time, and no date was mentioned
by Ms. Johnson of what happened. At no time during any of my conversations with the parents
and Ms. Johnson did anyone state that Lisa had been present when the baby's leg was
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manipulated in the walker. That includes on December 11, 2002 when the entire Safe and
Healthy Families Team of physicians met with the extended family and were told the details by
Ms. Johnson.
3. In my meetings with Brig and Lisa Dunsmore, I specifically asked them if Zachary
had shown any sign of favoring his left leg or any change from his "baseline" of fussiness during
the week preceding £is admission to Primary Childrens' Hospital on November 17, 2002.
Neither of them could identify any signs that his leg was in pain or that there was any change in
his "baseline" behavior until after noon on Saturday, November 16,2002, Neither Brig nor Lisa
Dunsmore told me in those meetings that Brig Dunsmore had not even provided care for Zachary
from Wednesday the 131* of November until Saturday morning the 16th of November. Brig and
Lisa were asked specifically if Zachary had shown any signs of pain when his clothes or diapers
were changed during the prior week and both denied he had shown any signs of pain. Neither
Brig nor Lisa Dunsmore told me that they changed his diapers and his clothes without touching
or manipulating his left leg.
4. Both Lisa and Brig Dunsmore told me on November 18,2002, that Zachary had been
bearing weight on both his legs the morning of November 16,2002 prior to Lisa leaving the
home. Further, Brig Dunsmore told me that Zachaiy had been bearing weight on both his legs
after Lisa left to go shopping that same morning and that he had been "fine". The Dunsmores
told me in these meetings that Zachary liked to bounce on their knees. They demonstrated with
their hands how this happened.
5, If Brig and Lisa Dunsmore have testified in the juvenile court trial that they never said
Zachary bad been bearing weight on both legs on Saturday morning, November 16,2002,1
believe they are mistaken. I did not make up that detail, and Lisa Dunsmore repeated that detail
during the family meeting on December 11,2002, having been specifically asked about that by
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Dr. Lori Frasier,
Dated this JL day of June, 2003

Bruce Herman, M.D.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^L day of June 2003

NOTARY H1MJ
SUSAN K. GREAVES
100N*.UodfcafDrfc*
Sift UtoCfty, Wall 54115
My CommfftJoA Expfitt

Notary Public residing in
Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires f**/f

September 14, SOW

. STATE OF PTAB ^
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ATTACHMENT 4
Letter from Bruce Herman, M.D.
Karen Hansen, M.D. and
Lori D. Fraiser, M.D.
December 17, 2002.
State's Exh. 7.
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100 North Medial Drive
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PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER

(8ODS88-200O

1HC

A Serrice of Ititer mountain Health Care

(801) 588-2460 Fax

NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIALITY
This document is for me express purpose of facilitating the Utah State Law pertaining to the Reporting and investigation of Child
Abuse or Neglect (Section 62A-4a^03, or as amended). Release to anyone, other than those directly authorized in the legal
process, is illegal and unethical.

December 17, 2002
RE: ZACHARY DUNSMORE
DOB: 4/6/02
On December 11, 2002 a meeting was held with the family of Zachary Dunsmore to
provide further information concerning his injuries. Present at the meeting were
physicians from the Safe and Healthy Families, Dr. Bruce Herman, Dr. Karen Hansen
and Dr. Lori Frasier. Julie Bradshaw from Safe and Healthy Families was also present.
Paul Dean from SIPAPU and Kari Cunningham from DCFS were present. The child's
pediatrician Dr. Dave Folland was present. Zachary's mother and father Lisa and Brigg
Dunsmore as well as Brigg's father and Lisa's parents Linda and Brent Johnson were
present. The purpose of the meeting was to clarify history from the family concerning
Zachary's injuries.
Grandmother gave a history of changing Zachary's diaper on November 21st. She
states that he tried to reach down and grab his left foot and bent his leg up and she
heard a painful cry. This reminded her of a previous event that occurred on November
13th. She had gone to Zachary's home at approximately 11 AM. She tried to place him
in his walker. She brought this walker today and used it to demonstrate the history
provided. His right foot made it through the hole in his walker but his left leg became
stuck. His knee bent with his foot behind him. Grandmother states that she pushed
with her left hand and thumbs on his left leg above his knee and with her left hand and
pulled down his foot with her right hand. She states' that he cried vigorously but
calmed down within 15 seconds. She states that after that time he used his leg
normally. Further questioning to the family revealed that they did not notice Zachary to
be in pain over the next few days. Specifically they were able to get him into and out
of his pajamas and change his diaper without-significant pain. On Friday November
15th he was seen by Dr. Folland. Dr. Folland did not note any abnormalities in his leg
exam. The child was given a flu shot in his left leg. Mother states that the nurse held
his left leg down while he was sitting in her lap. She states that he did cry with the
shots and mother could not differentiate pain from Zachary being held down versus
pain from the shot.
The events of Saturday November 16 were also reviewed. Mother states that she got
up in the morning and placed Zachary on the floor and that he played on the floor. He
was placed in his walker for a brief time as well. She did not notice anything unusual
about his behavior that morning and left at approximately 1010. She got back at
approximately 1830 and at that time noted that he was not moving his left leg and
appeared to be in pain when his leg was palpated. The family sought care the next
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morning because of the continued symptoms and an x-ray performed at that time
revealed a left femur fracture. Brigg was unable to provide any history of the events
while he was caring for Zachary on advice from his lawyer.
Lisa then provided a history that she felt may have caused his skull fracture. She
relates an incident occurring during the week before Halloween. Mother states that she
placed him in a Graco swing. She brought the swing today and demonstrated the
history she provided. She turned on the swing and went to the bathroom. When she
was coming out of the bathroom she heard a thump and then heard Zachary cry. She
states that she found him lying face up on the bar of the swing. She picked him up and
he stopped crying immediately. She states that he continued to act normally and eat
well for the rest of that day and the next several days. Mother does not remember any
swelling nor tenderness of his scalp. The surface of the floor was a padded burbor
carpet.
t
During the meeting several family members spoke, supporting the family. Dr. Folland
also spoke positively of the parents, grandparents, and extended social support system.
Dr. Folland spoke of Zachary as a very happy, mellow infant. Of note was that Mr.
Johnson remarked that Zachary did have periods of fussiness, usually in the evening,
and that he calmed when being held.
Drs. Herman, Hansen and Frasier subsequently met with Kari Cunningham and Paul
Dean. Dr. John Smith was also consulted. The films were reviewed with Dr. Smith and
the proposed mechanism was discussed. It was felt by the physicians from Safe and
Healthy Families as well as Dr. Smith that unreasonable forces would have been
required to cause the femur fracture. It was also felt that Zachary would become
symptomatic soon after the injury. There had been concerns from the family and Dr.
Folland about Zachary's high pain threshold. It should be noted that numerous
witnesses have stated that Zachary responded appropriately to painful stimuli. This
included his flu shot on Friday November 15th as well as an intramuscular injection that
Paul Dean witnessed Zachary receiving in the hospital. In view of Zachary's apparently
normal pain response, it is highly unlikely thafZachary would have remained
asymptomatic for several days after an injury on November 13th and then become
symptomatic on November 16th. It is also highly unlikely that the mechanism described
by Grandmother caused the fracture.
The mechanism for the skull fracture was also discussed. It was felt that the episode
described by mother would be highly unlikely to cause an occipital skull fracture. The
occipital bone is quite difficult to fracture and would require significant force. A minor
fall such as described by mother would be unlikely to provide the necessary forces to
fracture the occipital bone.
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No history has been provided to adequately explain either Zachary's femur fracture or
his skull fracture. Therefore, non-accidental injury must be highly considered. This was
discussed with Paul Dean as well as with Kari Cunningham. It was also discussed in a
subsequent meeting with Dr. Folland.
It is our feeling that Zachary and his parents have significant social support systems. It
is our opinion that the risks of subsequent injury to Zachary are low in his present social
situation. We will work with DCFS and SIPAPU to arrange a protective situation that is
equitable to the family while still providing safety for Zachary.
It should be noted that Zachary's follow up skeletal survey on December 2nd showed no
new injuries. It showed a well-developed callus of his left femur.

Bruce Herman, M.D.
Associate Professor
University of Utah Health Sciences Center
Center for Safe and Healthy Families
Primary Children's Medical Center

Karen Hansen, M.D.
Associate Professor
':'~
University of Utah Health Sciences Center
Center for Safe and Healthy Families
Primary Children's Medicaj Center

Lori D. Frasier, M.D.
Associate Professor
University of Utah Health Sciences Center
Center for Safe and Healthy Families
Medical Director, Medical Assessment Team
Primary Children's Medical Center
cc:

Kari Cunningham, DCFS
Paul Dean, SIPAPU
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John T. Smith Letter
December 11,2002.
Def.Exh. 15.
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DUNSMORE, ZACHARY A
Chart #31266
December 11, 2002
This note is dictated in clarification of the injuries sustained by Zachary and addresses
possible etiology and mechanism. This note is generated to clarify issues and possible
mechanism related to this fracture. My first evaluation of Zachary occurred on November
27, 2002. At that time, he was noted to have a fracture of the metaphysis of the distal
femur, which had significant fracture callus present. At that time, it was my impression
that the fracture was between 14 in 20 days out from the initial injury.
In reviewing the chronology of this fracture, the grandmother noted that she possibly
Injured the leg by placing the leg through the footing of the walker on November 13,
2002. The child was taken in for routine immunizations on November 15. At that time, it
was felt the child did not have pain in the distal femur while being held down for these
immunizations. He was seen for his initial evaluation of this fracture on November 17,
2002, at which time the distal metaphyseal fracture was documented. I was not involved
in his care until November 27, 2002.
Regarding possible etiology, the most common way that I've seen this fracture is due to
an accidental fall off a bed while engaging in diaper changing or other activities. I
explained to the family that the fracture could occur as a result of a forceful wedging of
the leg over a fulcrum. It is difficult to know the degree of force that would be required to
produce this fracture by this mechanism. There are certainly no biomechanical testing or
other guidelines to determine this degree of force. In addition, I feel that once this type
of fracture occurred, given the amount of displacement on the initial film, that we would
expect to have significant pain with activities such as diaper changing or any manipulation
of the limb. It is, therefore, difficult to match the chronology of the fracture to the onset
of symptoms being approximatelylhree days later. I cannot determine a fracture etiology
with any certainty based on the fracture pattern that is seen.
This information was discussed with Dr. Bruce Herman and the Child Protection Team, and
I was asked to document it for the medical record.

John T. Smith, M.D.
CC:

Bruce Herman, M.D.
David Folland, M.D.
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ATTACHMENT 6
Utah Supreme Court Order
Granting Certiorari
December 22, 2004.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah, in the
interest of,
Z.D. and A.D.,
children under eighteen
years of age,
Case No. 20040837-SC
State of Utah
Petitioner
v.
S . B. D. and L.D.,
Respondents

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon the Petitions for Writ
of Certiorari, filed by the State of Utah and the Guardian ad
Litem on September 29, 2004.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of
review in its assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence.
FOR THE COURT

Date

^ ^
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Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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